For much of the past century, investment advice carried a clear meaning: fiduciary advice. Investment advisers were legally and structurally distinct from brokers, obligated to act solely in their clients’ interests and to avoid conflicts of interest whenever possible. Brokers, by contrast, operated in commercial, product-distribution relationships governed primarily by disclosure and suitability standards.
That distinction was fundamentally altered in 2019, when the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission finalized Regulation Best Interest, Form CRS, and related interpretive guidance under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940. Together, these measures completed a long-running effort to “harmonize” brokerage sales and fiduciary advice in the eyes of investors—reframing conflicts as ubiquitous and manageable rather than presumptively disqualifying.
This article examines how that regulatory shift reshaped the meaning of “best interest,” why procedures and disclosures now carry unprecedented weight, and what the implications may be as a new SEC in 2025 reconsiders the balance between fiduciary enforcement and disclosure-based investor protection.
